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Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996)
INTRODUCTION
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar ("Abdul-Jabbar") brought suit against
General Motors Corporation and its advertising agency, Leo Burnett
Co., (collectively "GMC"), alleging violations of the Lanham Act1
and California's statutory and common law right of publicity.2 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California
found that Abdul-Jabbar had "abandoned the name Lew Alcindor,
and ... abandoned the right to protect that name, and the right to assert
any other rights that flow from his having had that name at one time
in the past."3 As a result, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of GMC on both the Lanham Act and the state law causes of
action.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded. The reviewing court held "that the question
of whether Abdul-Jabbar's Lanham Act claim should succeed is a
question for the jury ... because [it] could reasonably conclude that ...
[certain] factors weigh in plaintiff s favor."5 Similarly, with respect
to the state law claims, the appellate court held that "[w]hether or not
Lew Alcindor 'equals' Kareem Abdul-Jabbar ... is a question for the
jury.
FACTS
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar was named Ferdinand Lewis "Lew"
Alcindor when he was born and played basketball under that name
1. 15 U.S.C. §1125 (a) (1992).
2. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors, Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir.
1996).
3. Id. at 410.
4. Id
5. Id. at 413.
6. Id at 414.
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throughout his college career and into his early years in the National
Basketball Association ("NBA").7 Abdul-Jabbar converted to Islam
during college and used the name "Kareem Abdul-Jabbar" among
friends. It was not until several years later, in 1971, that he recorded
the -name under an Illinois recordation statute.8 Thereafter, Abdul-
Jabbar played basketball and endorsed products under that name, and
has not used the name "Lew Alcindor" for commercial purposes in
more than ten years.9
Abdul-Jabbar's complaint arises out of a GMC television
commercial that aired during the 1993 NCAA men's basketball
tournament.'0 The commercial consisted of a disembodied voice,
silent printed messages on the screen, and a picture and price of an
automobile. The advertisement begins with the voice asking, "How
'bout some trivia?""1 This is followed by the printed words, "You're
talking to the champ."' 2 The voice then asks, "Who holds the record
for being voted the most outstanding player in this tournament?"13 A
printed message follows stating, "Lew Alcindor, UCLA '67, '68,
'69."14 Next, the voice asks, "Has any car made the 'Consumet
Digest's Best Buy' list more than once? The Oldsmobile Eighty-
Eight has."' 5 The automobile and its price then appear, followed by
more vocal and visual messages.
GMC did not obtain Abdul-Jabbar's consent nor pay him for the
use of his former name during this commercial.1 6 The ad aired
approximately five or six times during March of 1993. Once Abdul-
Jabbar complained to GMC about the commercial, the company
promptly withdrew it. 7 The parties are in dispute over whether
Abdul-Jabbar abandoned the name Lew Alcindor and whether the ad
could be construed as an endorsement by Abdul-Jabbar of the
7. Id at 409.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Oldsmobile.'8
LEGAL ANALYSiS
This appeal was taken from a grant of a summary judgment motion
for GMC. The appellate court began its analysis with the issue of
summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of a summary judgment
motion, "[ain appellate court must determine, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are
any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court
correctly applied the relevant substantive law."'19 A court must not
"weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted but
only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."'2
I. THE LANHAM ACT
"[A]n express purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect commercial
parties against unfair competition."' In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit held that false endorsement claims are properly
cognizable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit held actionable a "false endorsement claim based on the
unauthorized use of a celebrity's identity ... [which] alleges the
misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or device as a visual likeness,
vocal imitation, or other uniquely distinguishing characteristic, which
is likely to confuse consumers as to the plaintiff's sponsorship or
approval of the product."'  Abdul-Jabbar's first contention is that
GMC's unauthorized use of his birth name, Lew Alcindor, is likely
to confuse consumers as to his endorsement of the Olds Eighty-Eight,
and thus violates the Lanham Act. 4
In response to Abdul-Jabbar's claim, GMC raised two defenses: 1.)
18. Id. at 409-10.
19. Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.
1994).
20. Id. at 1131.
21. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992).
22. Id at 1107.
23. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 410.
24. Id.
1997] 398
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Abdul-Jabbar lost his rights to the name Lew Alcindor when he
"abandoned" it; and 2.) GMC's use of the name Lew Alcindor was a
nominative fair use which is not subject to the protection of the
Lanham Act.' The district court found both defenses valid, and used
15 U.S.C. §1127 to support its view of the abandonment defense.
Section 1127 provides in relevant part:
A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" when one
of the following occurs: (1) When its use has been
discontinued with intent not to resume such use.
Intent not to resume may be inferred from
circumstances. Nonuse for two consecutive years
shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. "Use"
of a mark means the bona fide use of that mark made
in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to
reserve a right in a mark. (2) When any course of
conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as
well as commission, causes the mark to become ...
generic ... 26
After a prima facie case of abandonment has been made, however,
it may be rebutted by showing valid reasons for nonuse or lack of
intent to abandon the mark.27 Since Abdul-Jabbar admitted that he
had not used the name Lew Alcindor in over ten years, and because
the district court found that his proffered religious reasons for nonuse
were not applicable, the court held that Abdul-Jabbar had in effect
abandoned the name.28
In disagreeing with the district court, the appellate court noted that
"[w]hile the Lanham Act has been applied to cases alleging
appropriation of a celebrity's identity, the abandonment defense has
never to our knowledge been applied to a person's name or
identity."29 The appellate court refused to "stretch" federal trademark
25. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1992).
27. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir.
1985).
28. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 411.
29. Id.
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law to include such a defense because a person's birth name is not
given for commercial reasons and, therefore, cannot be abandoned
during the possessor's life simply because of a lack of commercial
use.3" The court went even further, stating that "[a]n individual's
decision to use a name other than the birth name--whether the
decision rests on religious ... or other personal considerations--does
not therefore imply intent to set aside the birth name, or the identity
associated with that name."31
The district court also cited the "fair use" defense, as an alternate
ground for dismissal of Abdul-Jabbar's Lanham Act claim. 2 The
Ninth Circuit dealt with this defense in New Kids on the Block v.
News America Publishing, Inc., in which it held that the use by two
newspapers of the "New Kids" name to conduct phone-in polls
measuring the group's popularity was a nominative "fair use" of the
name not subject to protection under the Lanham Act.33 The court
held that a commercial user would be entitled to the nominative fair
use defense if it could meet three requirements: 1.) the product or
service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use
of the trademark; 2.) only so much of the mark or marks may be used
as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and 3.)
the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.34 The
court found that all three requirements were met and the newspapers
were entitled to the nominative fair use defense.
In the instant case, the district court held all three New Kids
requirements satisfied, but the appellate court concluded that there
was a genuine issue of fact as to the third requirement, implied
endorsement or sponsorship.36 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
critical distinction between the present case and the New Kids case
was that "use of celebrity endorsements in television commercials is
30. Id
31. Id at412.
32. Id
33. New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306-09
(9th Cir. 1992).
34. Id at 307-8.
35. Id at 308-10.
36. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 412.
1997] 400
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so well established by commercial custom that a jury might find an
implied endorsement in General Motors' use of the celebrity's name
in a commercial, which would not inhere in a newspaper poll."37
Accordingly, the court held that "[1]ikelihood of confusion as to
endorsement is ... a question for the jury. '38 The court offered more
insight into its ruling when it added that GMC might have been able
to defend the Lew Alcindor reference as a fair use if it had limited
itself solely to the trivia portion of the commercial. 39  By using
Alcindor's record to make a claim for the car, "GMC has arguably
attempted to 'appropriate the cachet of one product for another,' if not
also to 'capitalize on consumer confusion."'4  In light of the
foregoing reasons, the court held that there was a "question of fact as
to whether GMC [was] entitled to a fair use defense." ' 1 In concluding
its discussion of the Lanham Act claim, the court acknowledged that,
in the past, it had considered several factors to determine if a plaintiff
had "raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the likelihood of
confusion over endorsement: '(1) strength of the plaintiff s mark; (2)
relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of
purchaser care; and (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark.' 42
The court held that "[b]ecause a jury could reasonably conclude that
most of the factors weigh in plaintiffs favor ... the question of
whether Abdul-Jabbar's Lanham Act claim should succeed is a
question for the jury. 43
37. Id. at 413.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d
302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)).
41. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 413.
42. Id, (quoting White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1992)) (holding that use of a robot dressed and posed like Vanna White next
to a "Wheel of Fortune" set raised sufficient question of fact as to endorsement
under the Lanham Act to preclude summary judgment), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
(1993).
43. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 413.
[Vol. VII:396
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II. STATE LAW CLAIMS: COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY RIGHTS
OF PRIVACY
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Eastwood v. Superior Court for
Los Angeles County" in its analysis of Abdul-Jabbar's state law
claim. The Eastwood court held that "California has long recognized
a common law right of privacy... [which includes protection against]
appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name
or likeness." '45 "The right to be protected against such appropriations
is also referred to as the 'right of publicity."' 46 The Eastwood court
set out four factors necessary to plead a common law cause of action
for appropriation of name or likeness: "'(1) the defendant's use of
plaintiffs identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiffs name or
likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3)
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury."'' 7 In past cases of this
nature, the Ninth Circuit has taken a very broad view of the common
law, holding that "California's common law 'right of publicity is not
limited to the appropriation of name or likeness."' 4 "The key issue
[for the Ninth Circuit] is appropriation of the plaintiffs identity." 9
The common law cause of action in California is "complemented
legislatively by Civil Code section 3344."5o In referring to the
relationship between the common law and the statute, the Ninth
Circuit borrowed the term "complement" from the Eastwood court,
which explained that the "statute is best understood as
'complementing,' rather than enacting the common law cause of
action, because the two are not identical."'" Section 3344(a) provides
44. Eastwood v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409,
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
45. Abdul-dabbar, 85 F.3d at 413 (quoting Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 416,
198 Cal. Rptr. at 346).
46. Id at 413 (quoting Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. at
347).
47. Id at 414 (quoting Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. at
347).
48. Id at414 (quoting White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398
(9th Cir. 1992).
49. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414 (emphasis added).
50. Id
51. Id (quoting Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 416, Cal. Rptr. at 346).
1997]
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in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or
for purchases of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or
services, without such person's prior consent ... shall
be liable for any damages sustained by the person ...
injured as a result thereof 2
"In addition to the common law elements, the statute requires two
further allegations: 1) knowing use; and 2) a 'direct connection ...
between the use and the commercial purpose."'53 The Ninth Circuit
views section 3344 as limited to commercial purposes and it has
"construed the statute's protection of 'name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness' more narrowly than the common law's
protection of 'identity."' 54
The district court held "that GMC was entitled to summary
judgment on both the statutory and common law causes of action."55
With respect to the statutory claim, the district court "reasoned that
section 3344 did not apply because: 1) Abdul-Jabbar had abandoned
his former name; and 2) GMC did not 'use' plaintiffs name because
Abdul-Jabbar 'did not [at the time of the ad] and does not have the
name used."'5 6 The district court held that Abdul-Jabbar abandoned
the name Lew Alcindor when he legally recorded his present name in
1971.sT The district court dismissed the common law cause of action
for similar reasons. The district court distinguished Carson v. Here's
52. Cal. Civ. Code §3344(a) (West 1971).
53. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414 (quoting Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417,
198 Cal. Rptr. At 347).
54. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414; See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (holding
plaintiff stated a cause of action under common law but not under §3344 where
likeness in question was a robot impersonating celebrity).
55. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414.
56. Id.
57. Id
[Vol. VII:396
8
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 11
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/11
ABDUL-JABBAR v. GENERAL MOTORS
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,"8 "on the grounds that '[o]ne cannot
say that Lew Alcindor equals Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in anywhere near
the same sense that 'Here's Johnny' equals Johnny Carson ... ""9 The
district court described the crucial factor of the holding "in Carson ...
to be 'that the ... nickname must be in the most common present use
so that it clearly identifies the person seeking recovery."' 60
The Ninth Circuit felt that the cases used by the district court to
support its view did not reflect the "proposition that the reference
must be 'in common, present use' under the statute or under
California common law."' Also, the appellate court felt that the
lower court's common, present use analysis was just a variation on
the abandonment argument, that is, that Abdul-Jabbar can only sue
for the use of his present name since he has abandoned the use of his
former name.62 Furthermore, the appellate court agreed with Abdul-
Jabbar's argument that "abandonment cannot be a defense to
appropriation because the right of publicity protects not only a
celebrity's 'sole right to exploit' his identity, but also his decision not
to use his name or identity for commercial purposes."'63
The appellate court ultimately held that Abdul-Jabbar had alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim under both California common law
and section 3344 because the statute's reference to name or likeness
is not limited to present or current use.64 Also, the appellate court
believed that "[w]hether or not Lew Alcindor 'equals' Kareem
Abdul-Jabbar in the sense that 'Here's Johnny equaled Johnny
Carson' ... is a question for the jury."6' 5 Abdul-Jabbar also submitted
evidence to show that he was injured economically because the ad
will make it difficult for him to endorse other automobiles, and
emotionally because people may be led to believe that he has
abandoned his current name and assume he has renounced his
58. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983).
59. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 415.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id at 414.
63. Id. (quoting White, 971 F.2d at 1399).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 416.
1997]
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religion.' These allegations suffice to support his cause of action.67
CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused
to allow the defense of abandonment to reach so far as to make a
celebrity's name generic simply because there was a lack of
commercial use.68 The court held that a person's name is unique and
"has a life and a significance quite apart from the commercial
realm., 69  The court also held that summary judgment was
inappropriate with respect to the "fair use" doctrine because, out of
the three requirements set out in New Kids, there existed a genuine
issue of fact with respect to the third requirement dealing with
implied endorsement or sponsorship.
With respect to the state law claims, the court read the common law
cause of action very broadly focusing on the idea of identity. The
court felt that it was "not important how the defendant ha[d]
appropriated the plaintiffs identity, but whether the defendant ha[d]
done so ... "' The court read the statutory state law claim in a much
narrower fashion. It held that section 3344 applied only to
commercial appropriations, but that it did not have to be limited to
present or current use. Since the court felt that Abdul-Jabbar's
identity had been appropriated by the defendant, and that it was a
commercial appropriation, it held both state law causes of action to
have sufficient facts to state a claim, therefore, summary judgment
was inappropriate.
T. Sean Hall
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 411-2.
69. Id. at 412.
70. Id. at 414.
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